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ABSTRACT
Over the past thirty years, the real estate industry has
been subject to three cycles of increasing amplitude.
During periods of prosperity developers often find most of
their projects are successful. Even poor development
decisions may be profitable in a strong market. However,
to avoid scrambling to survive in the downturn portion of
the cycle, carefully reasoned management responses are
necessary. This paper provides development companies with
specific action recommendations to survive a market
downturn.
An experiential learning model is used to analyze the
management responses of four Denver, Colorado real estate
development firms. Denver was chosen because it has been
mired in the downturn portion of a market cycle since 1984.
The firms interviewed have experienced at least one
complete real estate cycle, and were still operating in
July 1989. The study integrates the theoretical approach
of the experiential learning model, with the actual
management responses of the four development firms to
provide insight on surviving a downturn in the market.
The principal conclusion of this thesis is that companies
that follow the steps of the experiential learning model
can take a proactive approach to managing in a declining
market. They are more likely to anticipate the direction
of the market and achieve superior results. In contrast,
firms that omit any of the steps of the learning model
become reactive. Typically, they are unable to stay ahead
of changing market conditions and performance suffers.
Thesis Supervisor: Gloria Schuck
Title: Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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INTRODUCTION
I reject get-it-done, make it happen thinking. I
want to slow things down so I understand them
better.
-Governor Jerry Brown
The real estate industry is undergoing rapid changes.
Management will need to resist the "get-it-done" mentality
and make carefully reasoned responses. Historically, the
real estate industry has been subject to repeated cyclical
swings. Furthermore, some development firms have resigned
themselves to accepting the cycles as a normal part of the
real estate business rather than planning strategies to
mitigate an unexpected downturn.
During periods of rapid or even sustained growth,
there is tendency for those who create and
operate real estate space to get overly confident
about their successes and, consequently, they may
make some poor development/investment decisions.
Even some of the most inept real estate
participants can appear to be doing well when the
economy is strong. The true test of real estate
strategic management practices becomes more
evident when the market turns down (Green, 1988,
p.64).
The question then becomes:
Why are some companies unable to alter their...
strategies in response to market changes, while
others, when confronted with the same conditions,
quickly modify their behavior to achieve
continued marketplace success? (Bonoma, 1981,
p.116)
Real estate cycles are commonly acknowledged, but little
research has been done regarding the responses of real
estate development companies that have survived a complete
cycle. Kolb, a researcher at the MIT Sloan School of
Management, believes that improving a company's ability to
learn is a vital component of a successful organization.
He argues that,
continuing success in a changing world requires
an ability to explore new opportunities and learn
from past success and failures.... If managers
and administrators had a model about
how... organizations learn, they would better be
able to enhance.. .their organization's ability
to learn. (1973, p.27)
Kolb goes on to propose a learning model to help facilitate
management responses in a changing world.
This thesis will explore ways to improve the ability of
development companies to plan and implement strategies for
a real estate downturn. Can the learning model be a
prescriptive framework for surviving a declining market?
What can we learn from development companies' responses in
a downturn? This thesis seeks to answer these questions
and produce a proactive approach to managing in a declining
market. We analyzed the experiences of four development
companies in Denver, Colorado. Denver was chosen because
in 1989 it is in the midst of an extended real estate
downturn.
This study begins in chapter one with a review of the
cyclical nature of real estate markets and a historical
look at the Denver real estate market. Chapter two
begins the review of formal management literature and
explains Kolb's learning model. In chapter three, we
review our field research from the four Denver development
firms. Chapter four then integrates the field data with
the learning model to evaluate the performance of the
companies. The thesis concludes with generalized lessons
and recommendations for surviving the downturn phase of a
real estate cycle.
CHAPTER ONE
REAL ESTATE CYCLES
Real estate is cyclical. For every opportunity,
there's a problem waiting in the wings. For every
problem, there's an opportunity waiting in the
wings (Gollinger, 1989, p. 6B).
An examination of real estate cycles provides useful
information for making management decisions. Although good
time series data on non-residential real estate markets is
limited, Wheaton (1986) surveyed real estate markets in the
United States and determined the following:
1. Data back to 1960 indicate a repeated real estate
cycle with a periodicity of approximately 10 years.
2. The amplitude of the cycle increased in each of the
last two cycles indicating that vacancy peaks had been
climbing.
3. The market did not clear within a short time. It
remained either soft or tight for a number of years before
clearing. In soft markets it was several years before
rent concessions were offered and absorption responded.
In the same way, markets were tight for a number of years
until rents rose enough to slow absorption.
4. The supply of non-residential real estate was more
elastic than demand, which helped explain market
instability.
5. The real estate market was closely linked to both
short and long run cyclical movements of the macro
economy. Demand was influenced both by the rate of
employment growth and by the overall level of employment.
The supply side was also affected by the rate of growth of
office employment, but to an even larger degree than
demand. This caused construction to respond more than
office absorption, further increasing market instability.
Wheaton found that much of the building boom of the 1970s
and 1980s can be traced to a structural change in the
United States economy, namely the reorientation towards a
service economy. Yet it appears that the expansion of the
service sector cannot, and will not continue at the same
pace as during the 1970s and 1980s (Wheaton, 1986). Thus
the stage is set for another downturn in the real estate
cycle, and many professionals are pessimistic about the
near term future of the real estate sector.
THE DENVER MARKET
The Denver real estate market has experienced sharp changes
in activity since 1960. In addition, Denver is currently
experiencing a real estate downturn with office vacancy
rates of 25%. Therefore, Denver development firms are an
excellent resource of past management responses to a real
estate downturn. This information may be helpful to other
firms as they plan management responses to a downturn in
the real estate market.
Data on new residential units in the Denver Metropolitan
area indicate three cyclical peaks between 1960 and 1988.
The data illustrating the cycles are shown in Table 1.
The number of residential units produced annually varied
greatly over the course of a market cycle. From 1965 to
1972, total residential production rose 517%. However,
when the market turned downward three years later
production dropped 80%. Multi-family production, which
includes everything except single family homes, was the
most volatile segment in the residential market. Between
1972 and 1975, total production fell 97% - from over 25,000
units to fewer than 1,000. The expansion between 1975 and
1983 saw residential production increase at a slower rate
than the prior cycle. In contrast, the downturn portion of
the current cycle, which continues in 1989, has been just
as severe as the downturn in the prior cycle.
TABLE 1
NEW RESIDENTIAL UNITS
DENVER METROPOLITAN AREA
YEAR Single Family Mu
1961 peak 9,723
1965 trough 5,147
Percent decline 47%
1972 peak 19,189
Percent growth 273%
1974/5 trough 8,102
Percent decline 58%
1983/4 peak 23,664
Percent growth 192%
1988 trough* 5,422
Percent decline 77%
(* Assumes trough occurred in 1988)
lti-Family
9,230
2,129
77%
25,874
1,115%
884
97%
9,731
1,001%
1,431
85%
Total Units
18,953
7,303
61%
45,063
517%
8,986
80%
33,395
272%
6,853
79%
Source: Home Builders Association of Metropolitan Denver, Monthly
Statistical Reports.
Data on office vacancy rates are also available for 1961
through 1986. Although the timing of the cycles
illustrated in Table 2 is based on national real estate
cycles, three distinct cycles are apparent for the Denver
market.
TABLE 2
HISTORIC DENVER OFFICE VACANCY RATES
Occupancy
Peak
7%
3%
4%
occupancy
Trough
16%
21%
27%
Source: Wheaton, 1986
1961
1966
1969
1975
1980
1986
Data from the most recent Coldwell Banker Office Vacancy
Index of the United States is illustrated in Table 3. The
data for the downtown Denver office market indicate the
peak of the current market cycle occurred in 1981 when the
vacancy rate was 0.1%. The trough of the current cycle was
reached in 1987 when vacancy rates hit 30%. Since then
the market has been recovering slowly and had a 26.1%
vacancy rate in March, 1989.
TABLE 3
END OF YEAR VACANCY RATES
DOWNTOWN DENVER
Year Rate _(%I
1978 6.1
1979 1.8
1980 0.3
1981 0.1
1982 8.3
1983 23.0
1984 23.7
1985 26.0
1986 29.7
1987 30.0
1988 26.4
1989, March 26.1
Source: Coldwell Banker Office Vacancy Index of the
United States, March 31, 1989
OBSERVATIONS OF CURRENT CYCLE FROM FIELD SOURCES
Our fieldwork concentrated on firms that developed and
managed office space in the downtown Denver or suburban
Denver markets during the 1980s. Like most markets, the
downtown space in Denver is tightly focused. However, in
contrast to the sprawling development pattern of many
suburban markets, suburban space in Denver also tends to be
concentrated, in this case South of the City near the
intersections of 1-25 and 1-225, (see Figure 1).
According to our field sources, in 1980 the downtown Denver
market contained approximately 9 million square feet of
office space, while the suburban market contained just a
few million. By 1989, the downtown market had grown to 27
million square feet, with most of that growth occurring
between 1980 and 1985.
While growth in the Central Business District (CBD) in the
early 1980s was quite rapid, the suburban market expanded
even faster. Of eighteen business parks featured in the
Denver Business Journal's 1989 Map, only three were opened
before 1980. Between 1980 and 1989 suburban office space
increased from just a few million square feet to 24 million
square feet. However, by 1989, construction activity in
both the CBD and suburban markets had virtually come to a
halt.
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Many developers believed that the primary impetus behind
the building boom was sharply rising oil prices. As oil
prices increased, domestic oil producers expanded their
research on synthetic fuels. In the early 1980s, when oil
prices were forecasted to reach the $40-$50 per barrel
range, synthetic fuels appeared economically feasible.
Denver was well positioned to benefit from the synthetic
fuel industry because of the large concentrations of oil
shale in the region.
To exploit the perceived opportunity, oil companies began
relocating exploration and production personnel to the
area. Legal, accounting and other firms that provided
support functions for the oil companies also increased
staff. Consequently, according to a Coldwell Banker survey
(March, 1989), the downtown vacancy rate fell from 6.1% in
December 1978 to 0.1% for all four quarters of 1981.
The tight market caused rents and prices for office
buildings to increase rapidly. At the peak, gross rents
were between $30 and $35 per square foot in the CBD, while
suburban rents were slightly lower. Sales prices for
suburban office space reached $130 per square foot, while
construction costs were just $90 per square foot. Needless
to say, development activity increased dramatically.
By 1982, oil prices were declining and the oil-induced real
estate "boom" had begun to unravel (see Table 4). Vacancy
rates in the CBD rose above 10% in March 1983, and were
above 20% by September 1983. To maintain face rental
rates, concessions in the form of free rent and large
allowances for tenant improvements became the norm.
TABLE 4
AVERAGE CRUDE PETROLEUM PRICES ($/bbl)
Year
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987,
Source: U.S. Energy Information
Annual Energy Review
Price($)
3.18
7.67
8.19
8.57
9.00
12.64
21.59
31.77
28.52
26.19
25.88
24.09
12.51
15.41
Administration,
preliminary
The development firms interviewed believed that rising oil
prices drove the expansion in the Denver real estate
market. The data also indicate the relationship between
oil prices and demand for office space worked in reverse.
When oil prices fell, demand for additional office space
ceased and vacancy rates rose almost immediately. If they
all recognized the importance of oil prices, why did some
developers recognize the declining real estate market
earlier than others? How did developers react to the
downturn? The learning model outlined in chapter two will
help to explain the varying reactions development firms
made to the market downturn.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The right organization structure for a given
enterprise is uniquely determined by four
different inputs, which include: (1) the
requirements for competitive success in the
business; (2) the objectives and plans of the
enterprise; (3) the "givens" of the present
situation; and (4) tested organization theory
(Daniel, 1966, p.99).
Daniel's argument, taken from a Harvard Business Review
article, describes Kolb's experiential learning model.
Kolb, in his research at MIT's Sloan School of Management,
created the experiential learning model to enhance the
process of learning from past experiences. The
experiential model is a four step dynamic, iterative
learning model; it is illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
THE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING MODEL
CONCRETE
EXPERIENCE
ACTIVE OBSERV
EXPERIMENTATION REFLEC
FORMATION OF ABSTRACT
CONCEPTS AND GENERALIZATIONS
ATION &
TION
In the Kolb model, the learning process starts with a
concrete experience that changes the normal operational
situation. This concrete experience is the basis for
observation and reflection, the second stage of the model.
The third stage of the learning model involves the
formation of abstract concepts and generalizations. These
concepts and generalizations are the strategic options
which integrate observations into theories to make
decisions and solve problems. The final stage of Kolb's
model is active experimentation utilizing the strategic
options developed in new situations. The learning model is
iterative, and successful firms will continue to monitor
the new experiences and objectively reflect on them.
The first section of this chapter reviews articles that
discuss ways to improve a firm's reflection and observation
skills. Literature on marketing, product differentiation,
growth niches and product quality are reviewed to assist in
the generation of the strategic options. We also review
literature specific to the real estate field to further
establish strategic options for a firm facing a declining
market. Finally, implementation literature is reviewed to
help firms more effectively implement the strategic options
generated.
The second section of this chapter utilizes concepts from
the literature to develop an analytical framework, a
revision of Kolb's experiential learning model. This model
will be used later in the analysis of companies'
experiences, and to make action recommendations for firms
facing a declining market.
REFLECTION AND OBSERVATION LITERATURE
Experiential learning begins with a historical experience.
For Denver development firms, the historical experience
was recognition that a downturn in the real estate market
was either imminent or in progress. Only after recognition
of the changing market, could a firm move on to the
second step in Kolb's learning model, reflection and
observation.
The fundamental question for management is: What business
are we in? Until you have a full understanding of
exactly what commodity you produce, or service you provide,
responding to the experience is impossible. This
understanding is especially relevant for real estate
development companies. For example, Leinberger (1987,
p.48) states the obvious when he says, "we define ourselves
as being in the development business... this implies that we
will only be active during the good times".
Failure to understand your business can have devastating
results. Levitt (1960) argues that a number of
industries have declined because they were product oriented
rather than customer oriented. He adds that firms would be
better served by probing deeply into the basic human needs
their industry is trying to satisfy and determining the
best way to fulfill them. Thurston (1983, p. 168)
expresses the same idea by suggesting a firm ask itself
"what are the central competitive ideas and competence on
which my business rests"? Real estate development firms
need to determine whether they are in the development
business (i.e., they only develop new property) or the real
estate business (i.e., they provide a range of new
development and post development real estate services).
Thurston believes the process of determining strategic
alternatives begins with a thorough understanding of your
business. If you do not know what your company has been,
and particularly what it is now, you may be planning in an
environment you do not fully understand. Once a firm has a
thorough understanding of its business, it can move to
reflect upon the experiences it faces. Reflection should
start with a review and restating of corporate objectives.
In the case of Denver, these objectives will help guide the
development firms' responses to the market downturn.
At times, corporate goals remain fixed while the external
business environment is constantly changing. To remain
competitive, firms must be able to remain focused on
long term objectives while staying flexible enough to solve
the day to day problems in this changing environment. This
is the challenge Denver developers face today. They need
to remain flexible to respond to the daily problems and
crises they face in the weak market, but still need long
term objectives to properly position the company to survive
the downturn (Isenberg, 1987).
STRATEGIC OPTIONS LITERATURE
Once management has identified the components of their
business and determined corporate objectives, they need to
develop a strategy to achieve the objectives. Kolb
identifies this stage as creating concepts that integrate
observations into logically sound theories that can be used
to make decisions and solve problems.
One strategic option available to firms in a declining
market is improvement of marketing capabilities. In his
classic article, Marketing Myopia, Levitt (1960) argues
that "what usually gets emphasized is selling, not
marketing. Marketing, being a more sophisticated and
complex process, gets ignored" (p. 34). Levitt argues
that selling focuses on the needs of the seller.
Marketing, in contrast, focuses on trying
to create value-satisfying goods and services
that consumers will want to buy.... Most
important, what it offers for sale is determined
not by the seller but by the buyer. The seller
takes his cues from the buyer in such a way that
the product becomes a consequence of the
marketing effort, not vice versa (p. 38).
Hanan (1974) reinforces Levitt's argument by saying "there
is no substitute for market orientation as the ultimate
source of profitable growth" ( p. 63).
Levitt (1977) believes that:
An organization's principal marketing policies
and strategies affect that organization's
principal overall corporate policies and
strategies. That in all this variation...there
is a persistent... orderliness and logic, no
matter how much things seem to be different or to
change. This is the logic of the marketing
concept. The market calls the tune and the
players had better play it right (p. 113).
The way the marketing process is managed provides an
opportunity for companies to establish a competitive
advantage, especially in a competitive downturn
environment. Bonoma (1981) believes that one simple step
to redirect upper management's attention to the market is
to simply encourage contact between managers and customers.
This is easily accomplished by getting out in the field and
interacting with clients. A renewed commitment to
marketing can help identify the products customers are
demanding and produce a competitive advantage for the
market-driven firm. In the case of Denver, development
firms might accomplish this by contacting existing office
tenants to determine what it is they look for when making
occupancy decisions.
A second strategic alternative available to firms in a
declining market is product differentiation. Levitt argues
that all products are differentiable since "a customer
attaches value to a product in proportion to its perceived
ability to help...meet his needs" (1980, p. 84). Bonoma
(1981) expands on this idea:
To stay flexible and prepared for change,
management must regularly ask itself what
"augmentations" of existing products or service
lines might be added for competitive purposes
(p.120).
Differentiating your product to go beyond what is minimally
"expected" by customers can enhance performance and provide
competitive benefits. Furthermore, a competent marketing
program provides the information needed to make product
or service differentiation successful.
Additional strategic options to the downturn can be found
in literature on stagnant industries. Hamermesh and Silk
(1979) stress that
it is essential for managers not to let wishful
thinking color their view. Instead, they must
accurately assess the long-range prospects and
face the problems of competing in a stagnant
marketplace. Management's acceptance of the
reality of a continuing slow demand is a
prerequisite for developing successful strategies
(p. 162).
In addition, competition is more intense in stagnant
markets than it is in growing ones because one firm's
growth comes at the expense of their competitors.
Hamermesh and Silk found there were
three common characteristics of the strategies of
businesses that have succeeded in stagnant
industries: they identify, create, and exploit
growth segments within their industries; they
emphasize product quality and innovative product
improvement; and they... consistently improve the
efficiency of their production and distribution
systems (p. 163).
Real estate is generally acknowledged to be a localized
commodity, and the existence of small growth areas within a
largely stagnant metropolitan marketplace is common.
Harrigan and Porter (1983) recommend searching for a
"niche" which will have stable demand or decay more slowly
than the market as a whole. The objective is to avoid
stagnant areas by competing in a sub-market that is still
growing. Finding a niche requires an innovative and
creative management that looks beyond the obvious problem
areas. Nevertheless, utilizing niches to improve corporate
performance is a proven strategy for surviving declining
markets. For Denver development firms, this may mean
avoiding the CBD office market and concentrating on certain
suburban areas with strong demand or on product areas that
are not well served.
Hamermesh and Silk also found that innovation and quality
are successful responses to decline. Their research shows
that higher product quality is associated with a higher
return on investment, even in stagnant markets. By
emphasizing quality products, a firm is able to place
itself above some of the price competition prevalent in
stagnant markets. Product innovation takes it a step
further by improving the product and setting it further
above the competition.
Harrigan and Porter (1983) summarize:
Companies that can view an industry's decline as
an opportunity rather that just a problem, and
make objective decisions, can reap handsome
rewards (p. 120).
Leinberger outlines specific alternatives in his article
in the National Real Estate Investor:
The downturn development cycle is the best time
23
to pick up troubled projects, position the
company with land purchases or options...and/or
concentrate on third party fee business. It is
the time to get one's company ready for the good
development times. It is also the time to buy
(rather than make) existing real estate products
to create value through better financial terms,
better management or Just a good purchase price
(1987, p. 48).
Green (1988) conducted a survey of development firms in
Anchorage, Alaska to determine what factors were most
important for surviving in a volatile economic climate.
The responses indicated the following survival strategies:
1. Maintain high equity position to protect against
falling rent and property values, use leverage
carefully along with prudent market timing, and sell
off portions of your inventory during prosperous
times.
2. Have a strong property or two with seasoned
cash flow.
3. Concentrate on quality properties as they are
in demand in declining markets as well as strong
markets.
4. Maintain the ability to expand the company during
prosperous times and contract it during a downturn.
5. Horizontal diversification such as property
management, leasing and other third party business,
was helpful.
In summary, the literature identifies both specific and
general strategic options that can be utilized by real
estate firms facing a declining market. Successfully
implemented, it may be possible to profit from the decline
and emerge as a stronger, better positioned competitor.
IMPLEMENTATION LITERATURE
Machiavelli wrote in The Prince,
it must be considered that there is nothing more
difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of
success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to
initiate a new order of things.
Yet firms facing a stagnant market need to do just that,
initiate a new order of how they operate their business.
Greiner (1967) believes that approaches most often used to
introduce change are on a power continuum distribution. To
the far left are those approaches that rely on unilateral
authority. The center of the continuum is occupied by
shared approaches while on the far right are delegated
approaches to change. The shared approaches produce the
most successful changes because "individuals develop more
commitment to action when they have a voice in the
decisions that affect them" (p. 121). Furthermore,
the overarching goal seems to be the same: to get
everyone psychologically redirected toward
solving the problems and challenges of today's
business environment (p. 120).
Therefore, the shared approach is best.
Another key to successfully implementing change lies in
25
overcoming resistance. one common mistake managers make is
"to approach change in a disjointed and incremental way
that is not part of a clearly considered strategy" (Kotter
and Schlesinger, 1979, p. 112). Education and
communication of the new ideas often help people see why
change is necessary. In addition, involving the potential
resisters in the design and implementation of the change
is also successful. Kotter and Schlesinger propose a
decision making continuum similar to Greiner's, and
recommend choosing a point to the right on the continuum.
This point does not force change on people, but involves
them in it. They conclude by stating,
Change efforts using the strategies on the right
side of the continuum can often help develop an
organization and its people in useful ways (p.
113).
Testing and implementation complete the experiential
learning model. However, the management challenge does not
end with implementation. Real estate professionals need to
observe the new results and experiences brought about by
the changes implemented and continue the learning
process.
THE PROCESS MODEL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This thesis compares management theory and the real world
experiences of four Denver, Colorado based real estate
development companies. We will analyze the steps these
firms took in response to the market decline, determine if
they fit our process model - an adaptation of Kolb's model,
and finally make recommendations for better ways to
implement management change.
The process model has four stages. The first stage is the
recognition of a concrete experience that has affected the
firm. The second stage of the model is reflection and
observation. The firm must consider the implications of
the experience and establish goals that will guide the
response. The third stage is creation of strategic options
to be implemented in the new environment. Finally, the
fourth stage of the model is implementation of the
strategic responses. After implementing the changes, the
firm needs to monitor the results. These results then
become the concrete experience for the next iteration. The
process model is illustrated in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
PROCESS MODEL OF PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF RESPONSES TO A REAL ESTATE MARKET DOWNTURN
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CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDIES
Surviving in a rapidly changing business environment
requires a willingness to explore new opportunities and to
learn from past actions. In Chapter 2, we presented
literature and a learning model to help frame and guide the
process. However, we also intend to study past actions to
properly utilize the learning model. Case studies allow
one to learn by studying the experiences of others who have
already faced the downturn stage of a real estate cycle.
The lessons these Denver development firms provide may help
others prepare for the day their market slows.
In selecting subjects for the case studies it was necessary
to choose firms from a major metropolitan area that was
experiencing a downturn in the real estate cycle. Denver,
with an office vacancy rate of about 25%, met these
criteria. In addition to the current market downturn,
Denver also experienced a sharp "boom" period in the early
1980s. The opportunity to study development firms in a
market that had experienced strong peaks and troughs in the
decade of the 1980s provided an opportunity to compare our
learning model with the way in which change was handled in
the "real world".
We deliberately sought to speak with several types of
development companies. Accordingly, our four subject firms
included: 1) a local commercial developer, who during the
1980s, was also heavily involved in residential
development, 2) one national commercial developer with a
regional office in Denver, 3) a local developer
specializing in high quality suburban office development,
and 4) a local developer specializing in land development.
All four development firms had established track records
and were well respected in the Denver marketplace. In
addition to surviving the current downturn in the Denver
market, the local firms also endured a sharp real estate
cycle in the 1970s. The names of the firms and principals
have been altered at their request. Table 5 provides
summary data for each firm.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY INFORMATION ON FIELD STUDY FIRMS
Mountain
Location in Denver
Person Interviewed
Title
Types of Development
Market Decline
Concrete Experience
Date Recognized
Number of Employees
1980 - 1981
1985 - 1986
1989
S. Suburban
Joyce Conley
President
Office
Office/whse
Residential
Lease negotiations
more difficult
1984/5
Southwick
Downtown
Richard Ford
Vice President
Office
Rents fell
1984/5
Patterson
S. Suburban
Steve Patterson
President
Office
Commercial Land
Large tenants
left market
1983
Winchester
S. Suburban
Mike Winchester
President
Commercial Land
Office
Residential
Supply/demand
imbalance
1982
40 - 50
60 - 70
100
* Not including third party management business
The research technique employed for this study was
face-to-face interviews. Prior to his or her interview,
each person was informed of the topic of our research, and
of the learning model being utilized. We spoke directly
with the presidents of the Denver based firms, and in the
case of the national development company, to the vice
president in charge of the Denver office. Interviewing
only one individual per company was a weakness of the
research methodology as it could provide a limited
viewpoint on the company response to the downturn. The
actual interview questions are included in the Appendix.
The case write-ups cover each stage of the learning model
to illustrate what each firm did in response to the
downturn, as well as provide additional background
information on the firm.
Our goal in conducting each interview was simple: we
wanted the interviewee to tell us the story of how their
firm realized the market had entered a downturn and what it
did in response.
MOUNTAIN PROPERTIES
Joyce Conley, President
Company Background
Mountain Properties was the land development and property
management branch of Conley Construction Company. Paul
Conley established the contracting company in Chicago in
1958. As the company grew, he developed a close working
relationship with a local partner of a national real estate
development company. Conley Construction provided turnkey
construction services, and the partner handled the land
development and leasing.
In the early 1960s, Conley moved the company to Denver.
Soon after, Conley entered the development business in the
Denver area. He initially concentrated on office-warehouse
and small office park projects. Like most developers, his
business went through a sharp downturn in the Denver market
during the mid 1970s. However, the combination of having
general contracting operations in multiple areas in the
Midwest, plus a development company insulated Conley
Construction from sharp swings in the Denver market.
Pre-Decline Strategy
Mountain Properties handled the development operations of
Conley Construction from land acquisition through to
leasing and management of the projects. Conley
Construction handled the actual construction of all company
development projects. Leasing of the projects was
accomplished by a combination of in-house leasing staff and
cooperation with the local brokerage community. The
tenants in the warehouse and office projects were generally
wholesalers, distributors or local companies in need of
general office space. Mountain also handled the property
management duties for all properties retained by the Conley
family.
Development projects were concentrated south of Denver near
the intersection of the two main metropolitan area
highways, 1-25 and 1-225. Mountain began residential
housing development in response to the strong market of the
early 1980s. As with commercial projects, Mountain
acquired the land, Conley Construction built the projects,
and Mountain marketed the finished product in cooperation
with local brokers. However, due to the nature of the
housing business, Mountain also had to take on many of the
final construction tasks and warranty work. Expansion into
residential development led to a rapid growth of Mountain's
organization. At its peak, the residential division
employed sixty employees and was the main impetus of
Mountain's growth to seventy five employees from a low of
eight in 1980.
Recognition of Market Decline (Concrete Experience I)
Mountain realized the commercial market had softened
significantly in 1984 and early 1985 when lease
negotiations toughened. Although the company was able to
maintain nominal rent levels, often because of requirements
by lenders, free rent and more attractive tenant work
letters quickly became necessary to close lease deals. In
the residential division, sales traffic at the projects
dropped sharply. Home sales stopped as buyers balked at
pre-decline prices. In spite of the soft market, Mountain
continued to believe that "this was the last year of the
decline".
Reflection and Observation
When the Denver market entered the downturn in 1984,
Mountain had both commercial and residential projects
underway. Since Mountain considered itself primarily a
commercial developer, the company decided to get out of the
residential development business and concentrate on the
area it knew best, the commercial market.
Mountain had acquired land for new office projects and was
funded to start construction when it recognized the
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market decline. Nevertheless, the deals still "penciled
out" and their bankers agreed Mountain should complete
the projects. Mountain believed it had sufficient cash
on hand to meet expenses and complete the projects, so it
believed there was no need for immediate, drastic action.
During this time, Paul Conley was head of both Conley
Construction and Mountain Properties. Since Conley spent
most of his time overseeing the construction company, his
experience of almost three decades was not immediately
brought to bear on the problems facing Mountain. In 1986,
as the market decline lengthened and problems at Mountain
mounted, Paul Conley recognized the need for a full time
president. Conley believed an seasoned real estate
professional would bring experience and a fresh outlook to
the problems facing the firm. Conley hired the new
president in late 1986 and he joined Mountain in 1987.
Although Mountain had recognized the market decline,
projects continued to be started. New projects could
receive approval from any of five people (the president,
Paul Conley, Joyce Conley, or two of Conley's sons who also
worked at the company). Project managers would often seek
approval from all of them, hoping that one would say yes.
Formation of Strategic Options
Since home sales at its residential developments had
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virtually stopped, it was important to cut costs.
Residential staffing was reduced as quickly as possible.
Mountain planned to continue to meet its obligations in the
residential projects, and where possible, to transfer tasks
to subcontractors.
Historically, Mountain had operated under the philosophy of
"worry about making money, don't worry about saving
dollars." Now that the market had softened, management
believed it important to watch expenses more closely.
Expenses that Mountain had previously absorbed, now would
be billed directly to the tenants. Joyce Conley,
president, also indicated that Mountain needed to make
major improvements to its accounting system. The old
system did not provide accurate information on operating
costs and the financial condition of various development
projects.
Other options Mountain considered included build-to-suit
projects, and expansion outside of its traditional office
and office-warehouse development products. Mountain
believed it was important that new projects be heavily
pre-leased or pre-sold to reduce the development risk. In
addition, since Mountain managed its own properties, the
company believed pursuing third party management contracts
was a logical step to take at this time. Third party
management and fee development work could provide revenue
to help cover overhead.
A final option on which Mountain focused was enhancement
of its marketing and leasing abilities. Mountain's new
found commitment to leasing space was evidenced by Joyce
Conley's statement that, "... it is better than having
nobody, that is how you make your decisions in this type of
market." Brokerage would be a natural outgrowth of the
third party management business. It would provide
additional services for clients, act to prevent other
brokers from taking customers, and further increase cash
flow.
Implementation of Post Decline Strategy
As the decline lengthened, several internal problems began
to surface. First, the residential development staff,
which accounted for 65% to 75% of corporate overhead became
a large cash drain. Second, accrued expenses were coming
due and Mountain did not have a cash flow accounting system
to accurately forecast cash needs. Consequently, the
company could not manage its cash needs or determine how
much money its projects were consuming. Third, commercial
projects coming on line were renting at less than 50% of
the pro forma rental rate, and the cash flow from these
projects could not service the debt.
Mountain implemented a number of corrective actions.
However, due to management's belief that the decline would
be short lived, these actions were not taken rapidly. The
actions implemented fell into the following categories: get
out of unprofitable businesses, increase marketing efforts
to sell or lease existing inventory of products, produce
new products in the Denver area, and produce current
products in new markets.
To reduce cash losses, Mountain began to cut staff and
curtail its residential development effort. No new houses
were started unless they were pre-sold. Prices were
reduced on existing inventory to spur sales. Sales closers
were brought in to augment the existing team. As the
houses were sold off, Mountain reduced overhead by
subcontracting marketing and maintenance services.
The first commercial development response was to cease all
speculative development. Instead, Mountain developed only
projects that were pre-sold or heavily pre-leased. This
led the company to develop a small retail shopping center
with a partner. Mountain undertook the deal only after
raising the equity capital to cover the cost of the land by
pre-selling a number of pads for free standing retail
stores. Another response, undertaken to keep the project
managers employed was to search out new markets. Through
the construction company, Mountain was able to get involved
with office-warehouse projects in Baltimore and Orlando.
Like other new development projects, these were pre-sold or
substantially pre-leased.
Another management response was to improve the property
management effort. Existing properties were intensively
managed to attract new tenants and retain existing
occupants. To increase cash flow, Mountain began to manage
and lease property for third parties.
Despite the improved management services, cash flow from
properties fell, and loans had to be renegotiated.
Permanent loans on the properties were non-recourse, hence
Mountain had considerable leverage with its lenders. All
loans were successfully renegotiated, but in the process
properties were revalued to current market prices thereby
greatly reducing Mountain's net worth and ability to
finance new projects.
Joyce Conley became president of Mountain Properties in
1989, succeeding the former president who had quit in 1988.
Joyce remained optimistic about future development
opportunities in the Denver area. She indicated that the
downturn had taught Mountain many lessons which would stick
with the company. Mountain would concentrate on the
following: maintain an improved accounting system,
structure projects to limit risk, take profits as they are
earned rather than roll them over into new projects,
increase equity levels in all future development projects
to 20-30%, and stay out of residential development as it is
too capital intensive. Joyce indicated that they "are
regrouping now" and will "maintain until things [the
market] change".
THE SOUTHWICK COMPANY
Richard Ford - Regional Vice President
Company Background
The Southwick Company was a family owned, full service
national development firm concentrating on investment-grade
office buildings. These properties were generally located
in or near major cities and often served as headquarters or
regional offices for Fortune 500 companies. Denver was the
western regional office of the firm, responsible for
development and operations west of the Mississippi River.
Pre-Decline Strategy
Southwick entered the Denver market in the late 1970s to
develop a major office tower at a premium downtown
location. According to Richard Ford, "with the oil boom in
full swing, many large national companies - some of whom
were clients, were making plans to move operations to
Denver." Southwick wanted to be a part of its customer's
plans and be ready to serve their clients' future needs.
The office staff of fourteen was divided into two groups -
marketing and leasing, and project management. Initially
the marketing staff concentrated on marketing and leasing
Southwick's downtown project and did not engage in third
party leasing or brokerage activities. Like the marketing
staff, the project management team was tightly focused on
the downtown property. However, as that building neared
completion, Southwick began to look at other locations.
Proposals were considered for office buildings in the
Denver midtown area and in southern suburban locations.
Land was put under contract, but when the market downturn
began, these projects were abandoned.
Both national clients and local firms were sought as
tenants for Southwick's new downtown office tower. When
national firms with an ongoing relationship with Southwick
were looking for space in Denver, national sales people
would often bring those clients to the Denver office.
There, national and local marketing personnel would work
with clients to meet the clients' needs. Prospecting for
local clients was, of course, done by local Southwick
leasing agents. Southwick would approach local clients
directly since its property was not listed with other
brokers. However, if outside brokers approached them,
Southwick would consider the deal.
Recognition of a Changing Market (Concrete Experience I)
By 1984, when rents began dropping rapidly, Southwick
knew the market was in trouble. Concessions also began
getting out of hand. Tenants such as accounting and law
firms that had been expanding fast and demanding more space
at ever higher prices, stopped growing. Suddenly they
became price sensitive. They began looking for better
quality and less expensive space as much as two years
before existing leases expired. Prospective landlords
would offer attractive packages of lower rent, free rent
and tenant improvements to lure new tenants into empty
space. Current landlords would often counter with
attractive deals of their own. Gross rents in the downtown
area fell from a peak of $30- $35 per square foot in 1982
to $10-$12 per square foot in 1985.
According to Ford:
When oil prices began to fall in 1982, major oil
companies that had been leasing anything
available vanished from the market. Then, they
began to transfer Denver based personnel to other
locations and sublease space as it became
available.
Reflection and Observation
Southwick's management in Denver considered many options
before asking Southwick's chairman for a decision.
Options presented to the chairman were: 1) close the
regional office and leave Denver, 2) pursue development
projects in other western cities, 3) expand into third
party management and brokerage, and 4) establish a real
estate consulting practice. Since the chairman believed in
the long term prospects for the Denver market, he chose to
keep the office open and establish Southwick as a committed
member of the Denver market. Subsequently, he refocused
the Denver office on four areas:
1) Enhance the leasing effort for the downtown office
tower,
2) Locate and acquire either investment grade
properties with cash flow for the Southwick
portfolio, or distressed properties that could be
turned around,
3) Explore development opportunities in other western
cities, and
4) Establish third party management and leasing
relationships.
Formation of Strategic Options
Southwick's number one priority was to lease the new
downtown building. Cash flow had to be increased enough to
make the office self supporting. Only after the tower had
been leased, could Southwick's strengths in brokerage and
property management be applied to the general market and
thereby generate additional cash.
Acquiring additional properties, either for long-term
investment or turnaround projects, was a second priority.
A declining market offered many possibilities to acquire
well built property, in good locations, at distressed
prices. Such property could be held in the Southwick
portfolio until the market recovered, and then it could
be sold.
New projects outside of Denver would have to be started, or
project development staff would have to be transferred to
other offices. Increased travel and customer contact might
lead to property acquisitions that met the new objectives
for the group.
Expanding into third party brokerage and management offered
Southwick two major opportunities. First was the chance to
diversify and gain additional revenue. Second, increased
contact with customers and brokers could produce leads on
investment grade property or distressed property for the
Southwick portfolio or new development projects.
Implementation of Post Decline Strategy
Southwick's first move was to market its existing
downtown project more intensively. Prospective large
tenants were courted two or more years before their leases
expired. Floor plates that were designed for large users
were divided and built-out to attract smaller tenants.
Since other brokers were constantly trying to steal
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tenants, tenant retention became a critical factor in
keeping the building occupied. Much more attention was
focused on keeping the space currently leased competitive
with alternative space in other buildings and with sublease
space in Southwick's own building.
As the tower began to lease up, Southwick's Denver office
also began to branch into new areas. The office looked
into investment grade properties and turnaround properties
for the Southwick family and other investors. Building on
its success in leasing its own building, Southwick
entered the third party property management and brokerage
business. The Denver office was successful and in 1989
had 800,000 square feet of third party management business
and 200,000 square feet of third party leasing contracts.
Since the Denver office market was in decline, all further
development efforts in that area were abandoned. However,
because Denver was the regional office for the western
United States, office development projects in other major
western cities could be considered. Unfortunately, as Ford
noted, "the oil bust affected most of the southwest. We
looked in Seattle too, but no feasible deals were found."
When the tower was complete, the project management staff
was transferred out of the area. The office which had been
staffed with 14 people in 1981, was reduced to just 6
marketing and leasing people by 1985. However, as the
third party brokerage and management effort became
successful, the office gradually added people. By 1989,
the office was back up to a staff of 14 and was profitable.
As Ford reflected on the lessons he learned over the past
eight years, three things came to mind. First, do your
homework and know your market. Second, keep in mind that
exogenous factors such as the price of oil can kill a
market. Finally, use outside resources to help forecast
your market and check your assumptions. "Maybe there were
some signals out there someone else might have seen."
PATTERSON AND COMPANY
Steve Patterson, Jr., President
Company Background
Steve Patterson founded Patterson and Company in 1967 in
Kansas City. In 1970, Patterson and Company relocated
its headquarters to Denver. Analysis of properties in
the Denver area led Patterson to purchase a large tract of
land in the southeastern suburbs of Denver. The company
concentrated on the development of an office park on that
parcel. Patterson was a fully integrated development
company with the ability to handle everything from the
acquisition and development of raw land, to tenant
build-out.
While Patterson acquired the land on its own, it was not
willing to develop it without equity partners. Speculative
office buildings were developed with institutional joint
venture partners who provided "patient" equity. In
addition, Patterson constructed two buildings for large
clients who purchased the buildings upon completion. This
approach reduced Patterson's development risk while
achieving the build-out of the office park.
Pre-Decline Strategy
When the Denver office market expanded in the early 1980s,
Patterson was well positioned to benefit. The company's
suburban office park was in the early stages of build-out
and additional buildings were in the planning stages. In
contrast to many developers, Patterson differentiated both
its buildings and office park by developing the finest
quality commercial office environments. Steve Patterson
stated the objective:
to create office environments of unsurpassed
beauty and efficiency, to offer distinctive
designs that capture the eye and the imagination,
and to make a lasting contribution to Denver's
business community.
Patterson was successful at creating these distinctive
projects and it was rewarded with several awards for
excellence in architectural and landscape design.
To enhance the office park's contribution to the community,
Patterson and Company incorporated an outdoor art museum on
the grounds of its buildings in the office park. The
outdoor museum was a popular attraction for school outings
and weekend trips. In addition to the art museum,
Patterson constructed an open air amphitheater in its
office park. The amphitheater brought music to the
business community and was operated by a national
entertainment company on Patterson's behalf.
Marketing and leasing activities were conducted by salaried
in-house personnel. When marketing space, Patterson and
Company involved not only the leasing agent, but also the
tenant finish division and property management department
to fulfill prospective tenant's needs. Patterson believed
in providing an integrated service package to satisfy all
the real estate needs a tenant may have, thereby creating
maximum real estate value for its customers.
Recognition of Market Decline (Concrete Experience I)
In 1983, Steve Patterson knew the market had turned soft
when "large tenants vanished". The major tenants leasing
large blocks of spaces had been the oil companies and the
regional telephone company created by the breakup of AT&T.
When those users left the market, there were not enough
smaller tenants to fill the space coming on line.
Reflection and Observation
Patterson decided to maintain its commitment to the
development of high quality suburban office space. In
addition, management wanted the company to remain a fully
integrated developer and to offer additional services where
appropriate. Finally, since the Denver office market was
declining, Patterson believed it was wise to diversify both
geographically and by product mix.
Formation of Strategic Options
Patterson planned to follow a conservative game plan to
reduce market and financial risks. A market decline would
be avoided and profits would be locked in by selling assets
that would bring a good price. Financial risk would be
reduced by using the proceeds to pay off debt on other
property and by utilizing financial partners in future
development projects. The company would avoid assuming
additional risks by cancelling all plans to start new
speculative office buildings. However, build-to-suit
projects and development of new product types would be
pursued as a source of new development projects in the
current market. New geographic areas would be explored for
opportunities to develop office space.
Projects underway followed a strategy based on designing to
upscale market needs. This objective focused on a high
level of quality and innovation that would differentiate
Patterson's buildings and provide value for its
customers. Thus, the properties could maintain their
premium rent levels and property values. However,
maintaining higher rent levels would require additional
tenant allowance costs and lead to a longer lease-up
period.
Expanding into third party businesses fit into
Patterson's commitment to developing high quality suburban
office products. In-house tenant fit up services would
insure quality construction and control during build-out.
Branching into cleaning services would let Patterson set a
high standard in that area and give customers another
reason to renew their leases.
Patterson also believed that overhead expenses had to be
reduced.
People that did not fit would have to leave.
Their duties would be absorbed by others.
Increased efficiency and the elimination of
non-essential tasks would keep the ongoing work
load manageable by a skeleton staff. If
additional help were required for a project,
contract employees would be hired as needed.
Implementation of Post Decline Strategy
Soon after the market softened, Patterson sold its
headquarters building to a large corporate user. The
staff, which had grown during the market expansion years,
was reduced to earlier levels. Design efforts became more
focused on "designing for the market place".
In spite of reduced rental rates in the market, Patterson
maintained lease rates in its buildings. The company
believed the level of quality was such that the rents were
justified. However, maintaining the lease rates in a
declining market slowed the leasing process considerably.
To provide additional value to new tenants, Patterson
increased the value of tenant improvements.
Tenant retention also received renewed focus. Tenants were
surveyed periodically to identify and correct any
deficiencies. As current leases approached expiration
dates, tenants were offered competitive upgrades to their
existing space to encourage lease renewal.
To further enhance the office park and diversify its
product base, additional amenities were provided.
Principle among those amenities was a new athletic club,
developed by Patterson, which was located near the entrance
to the park. Membership was available to park tenants and
the general public. The success of the athletic club has
led Patterson to explore the development of additional
clubs in other areas.
Patterson was successful in finding build-to-suit work
during the downturn. The company constructed two large
office buildings for large corporate clients within its
office park and was looking to do additional build-to-suit
projects. Since office development in Denver was at a
standstill, Patterson decided to explore other geographic
areas that were not impacted by the oil bust. After
examining opportunities in several midwestern cities,
Patterson learned of an opportunity in Cleveland. The
company was able to take over a downtown office project,
secure approvals and begin construction on the city's first
new office tower in ten years.
When asked what advice he would give other developers
facing a declining market, Patterson said:
Always build the best product for the market
place within your budget. Always use equity
unless you have a credit tenant with a long lease
so that you can ride out the cycle. Have other
operations for cash flow. Only have a skeleton
staff: sub-out projects where possible, use
contract employees.
JAMES M. WINCHESTER INC.
Mike Winchester, President
Company Background
James M. Winchester established his company in 1954 in
Denver. His son, Mike, joined the company in 1976, soon
after graduating from college.
Winchester's primary business was land development for
suburban office buildings and office parks. After
subdividing the land and zoning the lots, Winchester sold
them to office developers who constructed the actual
improvements. The company also developed approximately 350
apartment units in the 1960s and early 1970s. These
units were held in the family portfolio, and by 1989,
approximately 200 units were owned free and clear. The
cash flow from the apartment complexes was a major element
in the firm's conservative financial structure.
Risk management was a key concept of the company's
development strategy. Winchester deliberately did high
equity, low debt deals. "Leverage only works in hot
markets with inflation." The company did not take risks in
the financial area. Winchester would accept the timing
and marketing risks inherent in land development, but would
not compound those risks by taking on high levels of debt.
Mike illustrated the desire to avoid debt when he said,
"people do desperate things when debt is big".
What debt the company did utilize was structured in a
conservative manner. Mike and his father would not sign
for loans personally. If Winchester entered into a joint
venture, a note on the land would be subordinated to the
construction loan. Sometimes in a joint venture, the
company would contribute the land free and clear. However,
in either case, if a project got in trouble there was no
recourse to the company or to the Winchesters.
Pre-Decline Strategy
During the early 1980s, Winchester concentrated on land
development. It anticipated the direction and rate of
growth of the Denver real estate market and acquired raw
land close to Denver shortly before the construction wave
reached that area. By the time development demand reached
them, Winchester had the land subdivided, approved and
ready for construction. Funds from sales were used to pay
off debt or to buy additional land.
When Winchester believed that land prices were higher
than justified by office rents, it would not raise its
bids to acquire the land. Consequently, other developers
often out bid them. As a result, the company's land
purchases slowed down as the market heated up.
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Occasionally, Winchester would joint venture office
building development and construction with a money partner
who would also be the prime tenant. In this manner, a
total of 350,000 square feet of office space was developed
by the firm during the early 1980s.
Winchester also entered the single family residential
development field in the early 1980s. Like commercial
land development, Winchester subdivided the land into
individual house lots. If homes could be pre-sold, the
company would construct homes in a joint venture with a
general contractor. Any remaining lots were then sold to
other residential developers. Winchester did not build
speculative homes. By utilizing the staffing
infrastructure of its partners, Winchester was able to
participate in residential development while keeping
overhead low.
Recognition of Market Decline (Concrete Experience I)
Winchester believed the building frenzy and previously
unheard of prices being paid for land in the early 1980s
indicated an imbalance in the real estate market. In some
respects it was a "gut feeling" that things were too good
to be true.
Mike indicated that the company recognized how dependent
the Denver area was on the oil industry. He understood
that the economics of the synthetic fuel industry were such
that oil prices of $45 per barrel were necessary for
synthetic fuel production. Therefore, when the OPEC price
accords began to unravel in 1982, Winchester became wary.
A second indicator of an impending decline was the "frenzy"
of building activity and land acquisition. According to
Mike Winchester, "developers were building office space for
a total of $90 per square foot and selling it for $130 per
square foot. This was too good to be true". By examining
the prices paid for land, it also became obvious that
developers were betting on sharply higher rents which
Winchester did not expect would materialize. Mike
Winchester believed that "computers allowed you to build
pro formas you wanted to see" thereby contributing to the
frenzy of acquisition activity and to the problem of
overbuilding.
Reflection and Observation
Winchester's primary business since its inception had been
commercial land development. Management believed that well
located land would be a profitable product, but realized
the inherent risks in land acquisition. Mike Winchester
believed the "reward window [the opportunity to sell] is
open a very short time, and as a result management of debt
and overhead really is key". Winchester tried to minimize
risk by limiting the level of debt used for land
acquisition. Equity used for land acquisition was either
funded internally or raised from wealthy individual
investors. In addition, the company did not undertake
speculative development, but would develop pre-leased
commercial structures and pre-sold homes with joint venture
partners. Winchester deliberately tried to limit overhead
by forming partnerships and utilizing its partners staff to
complete a project.
Formation of Strategic Options
Winchester had a conservative philosophy, and believed that
detailed market knowledge was critical to success in the
land business. Winchester had to know trends in local
economic and geographic expansion in order to buy raw land
in advance of development. As a result, Winchester never
considered diversifying its operations into markets
management did not know well. The Winchesters believed
they "needed to know their backyard" and they could only do
so in Denver.
Mike Winchester believed the company's long standing
philosophy had served it well and that it should be
maintained. The Winchesters believed land development was
a basic and fundamental business that they understood.
Winchester also believed there was a short market window
for selling. When the window appeared, profits should be
taken and used to pay down debt. In fact, the Winchesters
believed paying down a loan was equivalent to taking a
profit, even though the cash went to the lender.
Winchester also believed in the concept
pyramid. The company believed quality was
estate and that better quality products have
pull up the market. Winchester believed
projects would be successful even during the
of a real estate cycle and was willing to
development opportunities.
of a quality
a key to real
the ability to
high quality
downturn phase
consider such
Implementation of Post Decline Strategy
In response to the downturn, Winchester stopped office
development entirely and began to get out of the
residential home market. The company reduced its
portfolio of commercial office space from 350,000 square
feet to 50,000 square feet by selling to its
institutional partner. Proceeds from these sales were
used to pay down debt. By this method, the Winchesters
used their profits to make much of their land inventory
free and clear. The company viewed its land holdings as
excellent assets and was willing to hold onto them
indefinitely.
An unanticipated opportunity arose when a local property
management company went bankrupt. Winchester believed
third party management was an opportunity to earn
additional fee revenue during the downturn, so Winchester
acquired the bankrupt company's staff and client base.
Initially, Winchester managed over one million square feet
of office space and had a profitable operation. However,
the third party management business proved to be volatile.
Winchester's major management client sold the properties
and the third party management business had to be
abandoned. After that experience, Winchester decided to
stay out of the third party management business in the
future.
Winchester had the opportunity to participate in the
development of what it believed was a high quality
apartment project. In keeping with its conservative
nature, the company entered the project with a partner.
Winchester believed the high quality nature of the
product would succeed even in a weak market. In 1989, the
project was under construction and Mike Winchester was
extremely optimistic about its prospects for success.
Winchester continues to believe in the long-term prospects
for the Denver real estate market. The company will
continue to proceed in a conservative fashion and will
concentrate future development efforts on the high quality
component of the market. The company plans to get back
into the same businesses it pursued previously, but will
wait until it believes the timing is right.
CONCLUSION
From the four cases presented above, we can see that
recognition of the decline varied in timeliness from 1983
to 1985. Observation and reflection about corporate goals
and philosophies ranged from incomplete to a reaffirmation
of long-term company goals and policies. Firms considered
strategic options that focused on a well known and
understood "backyard", to a nationwide search for projects.
Implementation of the post decline strategy kept all the
firms in business, but some firms prospered as a result of
their responses to the downturn, while others appeared to
be struggling.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
The analysis begins with
did at each stage of the
indicates how companies
market downturn, and
weaknesses of firms at
model.
a consideration of what each firm
experiential learning model. This
planned their responses to the
illustrates the strengths and
various stages of the learning
Case Study Analysis Within the Experiential Learning Model
Recognition of Market Decline (Concrete Experience I):
Real estate developers must be able to anticipate market
declines. Early recognition of change is critical to
effective decision making and successful implementation of
new strategies. The four firms we interviewed recognized
the market decline at different stages. Three of the four
firms indicated that their primary recognition of the
decline came through changes in the leasing market in 1983
to 1985. The fourth firm recognized the imminent market
change in 1982, before it affected the leasing market.
For Mountain Properties, the first noticeable change was
tougher negotiations followed by a need to offer free rent
to close deals. Southwick did not recognize the change
until the lease rates at its project began to fall. Since
both firms recognized the decline only when it became
generally known, neither firm was able to avoid the ensuing
sharp declines in property value.
Patterson recognized the impending decline before it was
reflected in the leasing market or in building values.
The company focused on supply and demand for office
space. When the demand from large users, who had been
actively leasing space in its suburban projects, began to
dry up, Patterson knew that the supply of new space in the
pipeline would drive prices down. Since the company
recognized the decline before rent levels were affected,
it was able to sell one of its office buildings before it
fell in value.
Winchester recognized impending change in the land market,
before it was reflected in land prices or the leasing
market. As a land developer, the company focused on the
supply and demand of land. Winchester recognized that the
supply of land being purchased by office developers, and
the amount of new office space it would support, far
exceeded the anticipated demand for office space. From
experience, Winchester knew that this fundamental market
imbalance would lead to lower rental rates and higher
vacancies. Since Winchester recognized the decline
before real estate prices and rent levels were affected,
it was able to sell 85% of its office space before it
declined in value.
Our research indicates that early recognition of a real
estate market decline requires looking at indicators of the
future balance between supply and demand in various real
estate segments. Since land development is the beginning
of the production cycle, it provides the earliest evidence
of future building activity. An understanding of the
supply implications of land sales activity coupled with an
understanding of potential demand can provide early
recognition of the future direction of the market.
Reflection and Observation
The literature on reflection and observation indicated two
key considerations: carefully defining your business and
setting company objectives. To some extent, all of the
firms considered what businesses they wanted to be in, but
not all established clearly stated corporate objectives
and philosophies.
Mountain decided it wanted to get out of the residential
development business because it had become unprofitable.
However, it did not sharply focus on a specific market and
product segment, but focused on the need to produce. This
can be seen in Mountain's goal of keeping its project
managers employed. The company pursued this objective by
seeking out development opportunities in what it believed
were stronger markets. Rather than determining a company
goal or philosophy to pursue, Mountain chose to concentrate
on familiar products that had been profitable in the past.
A major cause of Mountain's inability to carefully reflect
on company goals and philosophy was lack of leadership. As
was discussed in the case, the chairman, Paul Conley, spent
the majority of his time running Conley Construction and
left the supervision of Mountain Properties to his three
children - none of whom had absolute authority. Without a
strong, focused leader, Mountain reverted to
historically successful, familiar practices rather than
reflect on market changes and innovate accordingly.
Richard Ford, Vice President of Southwick, was in a
different position than the other executives. As a
regional vice president without an ownership interest in
the company or the project, he was not in the position to
set corporate goals or philosophy. He could propose a set
of alternatives and recommend a course of action, but the
authority to set goals for the corporation and regional
office rested with the chairman. Thus, Ford was prevented
from using his personal knowledge of the market to reflect
upon and optimize the strategy of the Denver office as if
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were an independent company. He proceeded from the
concrete experience stage of the learning model directly to
the formation of strategic options. This appears to be a
drawback of national real estate firms. Individual
regional operations are forced to suboptimize their
strategies to accommodate the goals of the corporation.
In contrast, Winchester and Patterson had strong leadership
and were sharply focused on the needs and health of their
market. This was reflected by an established, and clearly
stated corporate philosophy. In the case of Winchester,
the philosophy was developing land in the path of growth.
For Patterson, it was developing the finest quality
commercial office environments. This was clearly
demonstrated by Patterson's commitment to distinctive
architecture and use of art in its developments. These
philosophies were the result of repeated reflection to
determine the direction of each business and guided both
companies through one or more market cycles.
Strategic Options
Each of the four firms indicated they planned to cease
additional speculative development. Mountain and
Winchester planned to curtail new residential development,
while Southwick and Patterson planned to stop speculative
office development. In addition, Winchester and Patterson
planned to sell office buildings and use the proceeds to
pay down existing debt levels. These decisions were
designed to take profits before the market declined too
sharply and to minimize financial risk.
In an effort to continue development activities during the
downturn, Mountain and Patterson planned to pursue build-
to-suit opportunities. Build-to-suit development offered
three major advantages: development risk would be shifted
to the buyer, fee income would be generated for the
company, and project development teams would be kept
employed.
Since the Denver market no longer offered enough business
to keep the development teams active, Mountain, Southwick,
and Patterson decided to expand their development efforts
to other geographic areas. Mountain planned to look
nationwide to find strong markets in which it could
develop office and office-warehouse products. Southwick
planned to explore development opportunities west of the
Mississippi river. Patterson, on the other hand, planned
to search for an outstanding development opportunity. By
focusing on development projects, Patterson could consider
niches within larger markets that were generally thought of
as unattractive, but were less competitive and
potentially more profitable.
Three of the developers interviewed planned to look for new
products to develop and services to offer. Mountain and
Southwick planned to enter the third party management and
leasing business in the Denver area. Southwick also
planned to acquire existing income producing properties or
turnaround possibilities. Patterson planned to look for
customer needs that were not being adequately served.
Patterson discovered a lack of high quality athletic club
facilities, and a need for high quality maintenance and
custodial services. As a result, Patterson developed an
athletic club, and expanded in-house maintenance and
custodial operations to include third party business.
Finally, three of the firms decided to increase efficiency
by enhancing their management systems and controls. This
move would serve two purposes: 1) it would increase
profits or cut losses during the downturn, and 2) it
would position the firms for faster, more profitable
growth during the next expansion. Mountain, Southwick and
Patterson planned to concentrate on improving their
marketing capabilities. Mountain also planned to gain
control over costs by improving its accounting systems.
Patterson planned to improve its depth of services by
strengthening management, maintenance, and tenant design
and build-out capabilities.
The planned management responses represent four levels of
priority; they are summarized in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
FOUR LEVELS OF PLANNED MANAGEMENT
RESPONSE TO A MARKET DOWNTURN
LEVEL ONE
* Reduction of market and financial risk.
* Sell some of existing holdings.
* Curtail further speculative development.
LEVEL TWO
* Shift market risk to buyer with build-to-suits.
* Seek development opportunities in better markets.
* Geographic diversification.
* Find new product types unaffected by market decline.
LEVEL THREE
* Horizontal product diversification.
* Third party management and leasing.
* Third party maintenance and tenant improvement work.
LEVEL FOUR
* Improve internal systems and operations.
The first level was reduction of market and financial risk.
To minimize losses in market value, developers must sell
properties before the market decline is generally
recognized. Consequently, all four firms planned to sell
some of their holdings and curtail speculative development
before values declined. Net proceeds from the sales were
to be used to pay down existing debt and reduce financial
risk to the company.
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After reducing market and financial risk, second level
responses concentrated on continuing development operations
with a lower degree of risk. One strategy was to shift
market risk to the buyer by moving into build-to-suit
developments. A second strategy was to seek development
opportunities in markets with an acceptable level of market
risk. The firms planned to accomplish the second objective
through geographic diversification into stronger markets
and expansion into new product types that were unaffected
by the decline in the Denver market.
Third level strategies involved diversifying into new
businesses closely aligned with current activities. The
most common response was to expand into third party
management and leasing. A secondary response of one firm
was to seek third party business for its maintenance and
tenant build-out operations.
Fourth level responses concentrated on improving internal
operations and systems. Three firms planned to enhance
their marketing and leasing capabilities. This activity
was intended to improve each company's ability to sell or
lease its own products, and for two of the firms, to
improve its third party services as well. In an effort to
control overhead costs, three companies planned to reduce
payroll expenses by a combination of layoffs, transfers,
and use of contract employees or subcontractors. Finally,
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in an effort to improve cost control and cash flow, one
firm planned a complete reorganization of its accounting
operations.
Implementation of Post Decline Strategy
All four firms attempted to cease all new speculative
development and complete existing projects in the Denver
area. However, this was not possible for all of the
developers. Mountain Properties was in the midst of the
production phase of a residential project and could not
simply abandon or sell the project. The infrastructure was
in place, speculative houses were finished, additional
units were under construction, and units that had been sold
required warranty work and other post sale services. As a
result, Mountain had to intensify its sales efforts and
maintain much of its construction activity. Nevertheless,
over a span of four years, Mountain sold the inventory,
subcontracted the sales and marketing effort, and finally
subcontracted the warranty and maintenance work.
Southwick, which had several additional office developments
in the planning stages, abandoned the proposed projects and
let land options expire. Winchester stopped all commercial
development plans and curtailed further residential
building activity even though it only had been building
pre-sold homes. Patterson stopped speculative development
within its office park and concentrated on other
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activities. In addition, both Winchester and Patterson
were successful at selling existing properties and used the
proceeds to reduce debt.
Mountain and Patterson pursued build-to-suit opportunities
in the Denver market, but only Patterson was successful.
Many build-to-suit opportunities require prior ownership
of land. Patterson, with its land holdings in an
established office park, was well situated. As a result,
Patterson completed two large office buildings in the
office park for major corporations. Mountain did not own
land in existing developments and was unable to attract any
build-to-suit work.
Three of the firms had planned geographic diversification
to find development opportunities. Southwick examined
projects in many western cities, but was unsuccessful at
finding attractive deals, as many of the cities were
overbuilt. Mountain and Patterson, however, were both
successful at finding development opportunities in other
states. Mountain went into known growth markets and found
development opportunities that it was able to successfully
pre-sell or pre-lease. On the other hand, Patterson found
an attractive development opportunity in Cleveland, a
market that had been overlooked by other real estate
development firms.
All four firms entered new businesses in the Denver area.
Mountain and Southwick took the path of expanding a current
business to a new set of customers. Mountain captured a
modest amount of third party management contracts in its
suburban market area. Southwick leveraged off its
successful experience in leasing and managing its
downtown tower, and went on to capture major third party
leasing and management contracts.
Patterson entered an entirely new business by adapting
its high quality strategy to a new market. The company
developed an architecturally distinctive athletic club near
its office park. As with its office strategy, Patterson
refused to compete on price, but chose to deliver a high
quality product in an area without similar competition.
Although unplanned, Winchester entered the third party
management business when a local property management firm
went out of business. Winchester was able to hire staff
from the defunct firm, retain the client base, and enter
the new business with few start-up costs.
Three of the firms chose to respond to the market decline
by improving their business practices. Mountain,
Southwick, and Patterson successfully improved their
marketing and leasing capabilities to become more
competitive. Mountain also made efforts to improve its
accounting and financial forecasting systems, but as of
1989, these systems were still not operating to
management's satisfaction. Patterson enhanced its asset
and property management capabilities, but only applied
those resources to properties owned by Patterson or its
partners. The company also strengthened tenant design and
build-out capabilities to bring that work in-house.
Additionally, Patterson actively sought third party design
and build-out business in other buildings both in and near
its office park.
Analysis of Fit Within The Learning Model
The subject firms followed the stages of the experiential
learning model to differing degrees. Figures 5 through 8
indicate the steps taken by the firms at each of the four
stages.
FIGURE 5
MOUNTAIN PROPERTIES
Concrete Experience I
lease negotiations toughened
free rent concessions needed
Concrete Experience II
four years to get out of residential
have stayed out of spec. comm. development
successful geographic diversification
no build-to-suit work
;1 successful pre-sold retail project
marginal third party mgmt. contracts
internal systems need further improvement
Strategy Implemented
got out of residential
geographic diversification
pre-sold retail project
third party management
accounting system upgrade
improved marketing abilities
Strategic Options
Reflection
& Observation
prevented by
leadership problems
N get out of residential 4l-
ceased spec. comm. development
geographic diversification
build-to-suits/pre-sold development
third party management
improve internal systems
enhance marketing abilities
FIGURE 6
THE SOUTHWICK COMPANY
Concrete Experience I
lease rates fell
rental concessions increased
tenants start lease negotiations in advance of need
Concrete Experience II
increased occupancy rate in downtown project
successful third party mgmt. and leasing contracts
no new spec. development
no development opportunities in new markets
no investment 
or turnaround 
properties purchased
Strategy Implemented
stopped spec. development
explored new cities
for devel. opportunities
sought third party
mgmt. & leasing contracts
sought investment &
turnaround property
enhanced marketing of
downtown tower
Strategic Options
Reflection
& Observation
not done locally
stop new spec. development in Denver
seek devel. opportunities in new western cities
acquire investment & turnaround property
expand into third party mgmt. & leasing
lease up downtown tower
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FIGURE 7
PATTERSON AND COMPANY
Concrete Experience I
large tenants disappeared
Concrete Experience II
still not doing spec. comm. development
sold headquarters building
1988 Detroit project started
two successful build-to-suits
athletic club reached member capacity
improved maintenance and tenant
improvement operations
Strategy Implemented
ceased spec. development
sold headquarters building
office project in Detroit
two build-to-suits
developed athletic club
maintenance and tenant
improvement operations
strengthened
Reflection
& observation
long term philosophy
of high guality, arch.
distinctive design
Strategic options
stop spec. development
sell assets
geographic diversification
build-to-suit office development
improve quality of operations
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FIGURE 8
JAMES M. WINCHESTER INC.
Concrete Experience I
supply and demand imbalance
development profits "too good be true"
"building frenzy"
recognition of market dependence on oil prices
Concrete Experience II
owned land free of debt
owned 200 apartments free of debt
1989 - high quality apt. proj. started
lost third party mgt. business
Strategy Implemented
sold 85% of office space
paid down debt
got out of resid. development
stayed in known (Denver) mkt.
started high quality apt. proj.
third party management
Reflection
& Observation
renewed commitment to
owning well located
land
renewed commitment to
conservative
financial strategy
Strategic options
sell office buildings
pay down debt
stop residential development
stay in known (Denver) market
consider only high quality development
The analysis would not be complete without considering how
well each firm's management responses followed the steps of
the learning model. It will be interesting to determine if
there is a direct correlation between using the model and
"success". The degree to which each firms followed the
learning model is illustrated in Figure 9.
FIGURE 9
CONFORMANCE TO THE STAGES OF THE
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING MODEL
Mountain Properties4 5
43
Patterson & Company
1
4~ 5
3
The Southwick Company
1
43 2
3
James W. Winchester Inc.
3
2
5
Mountain Properties undertook steps in the first, third and
fourth stages of the learning model. Although Mountain did
not recognize the downturn in its early stages, the
company did recognize its arrival when it affected
company business and the general market. Management
realized that it needed to make changes and began to plan a
strategy. However, because of leadership problems,
Mountain did little reflection to set a corporate
philosophy. Management identified numerous strategic
options and attempted to implement most of them, but was
only successful with a limited number. In general,
Mountain did not plan or implement its responses to the
downturn effectively. In addition, late recognition of the
downturn precluded many strategic options. Mountain's
approach appeared to be more reactive than proactive.
Since Southwick was a regional office of a national
developer, it had constraints the other firms did not
have. After recognition of the decline with the general
market, Southwick generated strategic options for submittal
to the home office. As a regional office, Southwick's
Denver office was not in the position to reflect on
corporate philosophy and make changes to fit local market
conditions. Overall corporate policy and philosophy was
set by the chairman. Southwick attempted to implement
its strategic options, but like Mountain, recognition of
the decline with the general market severely limited its
response. of all the options planned, Southwick was only
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successful in gaining third party management and leasing
contracts. It appears that being a regional operation of a
national concern impedes a company's ability to be
proactive in a changing business environment.
In contrast, Patterson's response was proactive and
included steps in all four stages of the learning model.
The company recognized the decline early by noting
changes in the characteristics of the leasing market.
Before considering strategic options, Patterson spent time
reflecting on where it wanted to go as a company.
Patterson decided to sell assets before prices dropped,
to continue following the company philosophy of building
the finest quality projects, and to utilize conservative
financing arrangements. After clearly stating its goals,
Patterson listed numerous strategic options. Patterson
then proceeded to successfully implement all of its
strategic options.
Like Patterson, Winchester was a local development firm
capable of independent decision making. Its proactive
response also utilized all stages of the model. Winchester
reaffirmed its commitments to owning land in the path of
future expansion, and to conservative project financing.
This philosophy helped shape the strategic options that
Winchester considered. Early recognition of the decline
provided time to reflect, plan, and act before the market
fell. Winchester successfully implemented all of its
planned options and even capitalized on an unanticipated
opportunity to get into third party management.
CONCLUSION
There are people who make things happen.
There are people who watch things happen.
There are people who wonder what happened.
-Anonymous
The stated purpose of this thesis is to determine whether
using Kolb's experiential learning model could improve the
ability of development companies to plan and implement
strategies for a real estate downturn.
The results of our field data indicate that the firms which
adhered more closely to the learning model implemented
strategies that were more successful. The explanation
seems clear, two of the four firms carefully reflected upon
past experience and corporate goals, and thereby produced
superior planned responses to the downturn.
The field data indicated that the most successful firms,
Winchester and Patterson, analyzed the balance between
supply and demand in the Denver market. They recognized
when potential supply exceeded anticipated demand. Using
Kolb's terminology, this was their concrete experience.
Since they recognized the impending decline early, they had
time to act before the market decline was more generally
recognized.
After recognizing an impending downturn, Winchester and
Patterson reflected on corporate goals and objectives.
This enabled them to determine what businesses they wanted
to be in and where to lead the company. After careful
reflection, Winchester and Patterson reconfirmed their
commitment to a clearly stated corporate philosophy. The
firms then utilized the corporate philosophy to shape
appropriate responses to the downturn.
Implementation efforts by Winchester and Patterson appeared
to be more coordinated and focused than the other firms.
Less time was spent on unsuccessful ideas. Efforts were
usually concentrated on areas where each company had
expertise. When new product or geographic markets were
considered, market research and due diligence preceded
entry into the market.
After implementation of their strategic responses,
Winchester and Patterson monitored the results. After
observing the results, they began the learning process anew
with additional reflection and observation. Although they
did not consciously utilize the experiential learning
model, their actions followed each stage of the Kolb
model.
Firms need to follow all steps of the learning model to be
proactive. Remaining proactive allows a firm to stay ahead
of changing market conditions and achieve superior results.
If a firm sacrifices, omits, or in any way bypasses any
stage of the learning model, its management responses
become reactive. Once a firm becomes reactive, it loses
the ability to stay ahead of the changing market and
performance suffers. Utilization of the experiential
learning model, in conjunction with the survival strategies
and four levels of planned management response to a market
downturn, will produce superior operating results during a
market downturn.
Firms can gain a competitive advantage by improving their
learning ability. Kolb states his belief in the
importance of learning:
Today's highly successful manager or
administrator is distinguished not so much by
any single set of knowledge or skills but by
his ability to adapt to and master the changing
demands of his job and career, i.e., by his
ability to learn. The same is true for
successful organizations. Continuing success
in a changing world requires an ability to
explore new opportunities and learn from past
successes and failures.... Learning should be an
explicit objective that is pursued as consciously
and deliberately as profit or productivity.
Managers and organizations should budget time to
specifically learn from their experiences.... In
my experience, all too few organizations have a
climate which allows for free exploration of
questions like "what have we learned from this
venture?" (1973, p.40).
APPENDIX
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
SECTION 1
0) Could you give us a brief history of your company?
1) What was your business strategy prior to the market
decline?
a) products?
b) locations?
c) market segements?
1. customer type
2. customer size
3. location
d) promotion
1. how did you sell or lease your product?
2. compensation of sales force?
3. motivation of sales force?
e) define your marketing effort
1. selling vs. marketing
2. did you use (post) occupancy surveys to
increase knowledge of customer wants
3. did you use professional econometric forecasts
in your planning effort?
2) How was product produced?
a) "greenfield development" or rehab?
b) purchase existing property?
c) in-house development or turn key?
d) what production expertise was in-house?
e) how were production people organized?
f) where did your firm add value in the production
process?
3) How was the company financed?
a) equity
b) debt
c) partners/partnerships
4) How were properties/projects financed?
a) equity
b) debt
c) partners/partnerships
5) How was your company originally organized prior to the
decline?
Staffed?
a) size
b) organizational concept and structure
c) key employees
d) ownership of company and projects
e) planning system/process
6) What do you think caused the market decline?
SECTION 2
1) How did you add value prior to the market decline?
2) Did this give you a competitive advantage? How?
3) How have you been adding value since the market declined?
4) Do you feel you currently have a competitive advantage over
other firms? How?
SECTION 3
1) What is your business strategy post market decline?
a) products?
b) locations?
c) market segments?
1. customer type
2. customer size
3. location
d) promotion
1. how do you sell or lease your product?
2. compensation of sales force?
3. motivation of sales force?
e) define your marketing effort
1. selling vs. marketing
2. do you use (post) occupancy surveys to
increase knowledge of customer wants?
3. do you use professional econometric forecasts
in your planning effort?
2) How is product produced?
a) "greenfield development" or rehab?
b) purchase existing property?
c) in-house development or turn key?
d) what production expertise is in-house?
e) how are production people organized?
f) where does your firm add value in the production
process?
3) How is the company financed?
a) equity
b) debt
c) partners/partnerships
4) How are properties/projects financed?
a) equity
b) debt
c) partners/partnerships
5) How is your company currently organized? Staffed?
a) size
b) organizational concept and structure
c) key employees
d) ownership of company and projects
e) planning system/process
6) Where do you think the market is going?
SECTION 4
1) What was the stimulus that prompted change?
a) external?
b) internal?
2) How was your strategy for change chosen?
a) who decided and had input?
1. unilateral
2. delegated
3. shared
b) was there outside help?
3) How was your new strategy implemented?
a) timeframe
b) was outside help used?
1. facilitator or consultant
2. is facilitator/consultant still involved with
your firm?
c) which internal people were involved?
d) what was the implementation process/strategy?
4) Do you feel the new strategy has been successfully
implemented?
a) why?
b) why not?
SECTION 5
1) Did reorganization (changes) change the company in any of
the following ways?
a) make it stronger?
b) make it more competitive?
c) make it more customer oriented?
d) make it more profitable?
2) Are you planning any additional changes?
a) why?
b) what are the current stimuli facing the firm?
1. external
2. internal
3) In the process of change or reorganization what was the
most....
a) difficult thing?
b) easiest thing?
c) rewarding thing?
d) frustrating thing?
e) surprising thing?
4) If you were to do it again what would you do differently?
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